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In the face of a pandemic, individuals may decide whether they take ac-
tions to mitigate the spread of the disease (cooperate), or not (defect),
resulting in a ‘disease dilemma’ similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. Co-
operation requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to
benefit others. The rate of cooperation within a population is directly
linked to the rate of spread of the disease. Unfortunately, evolutionary
game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to defect. Here, we
combine the disease dilemma with the compartmental model used for
diseases which do not confer immunity. We prove that if the time scale
at which individuals receive information is sufficiently rapid compared
to the time scale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges,
and the disease can be controlled. Our results may have implications for
the best course of action when confronted with a new infectious disease.
keywords: Pandemic | Prisoner’s dilemma | Evolutionary game dynamics |
Replicator equation | SIS Compartmental model
Decisions made by individuals affect the population, not the least in disease spread-
ing. Several researchers have investigated the interplay between diseases and decisions
by combining compartmental models with game theory [1, 2, 3]. Common considerations
are dynamics on networks or lattices [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and
well-mixed populations [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. We consider a well-mixed
society in which individuals choose to what extent they will exert preventive measures
to mitigate the spread of an infectious disease. There are two extreme behaviours: com-
plete mitigation, exerting maximal efforts to prevent the spread of the disease, and do-
not-mitigate, making no efforts to prevent the spread of the disease. The World Health
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Figure 1: In the ‘disease dilemma’ two people have the choice to cooperate, mitigating
the spread of the disease, or defect, making no change to their regular behaviour. This
is described by the two player non-cooperative game shown here in normal form. The
images used above were obtained from openclipart.org and distributed under the Cre-
ative Commons Zero 1.0 Public Domain License.
Organisation [28] and numerous other references including [29, 30, 31] argue that it is
reasonable to describe this situation with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD); see Figure 1.
The payoffs may be interpreted in the sense that if both Alice and Bob cooperate, then
they are behaving towards their mutual common good, but they are also making personal
sacrifices by changing their usual behaviour to mitigate disease spread. On the other
hand, if Alice cooperates while Bob defects, then Alices mitigation efforts prevent Bob
from catching the disease, thus Bob benefits from Alicess cooperation. Alice receives
no such benefit from Bobs reckless actions, therefore Alice is not only restricting her
personal freedoms, she is also at risk of catching the disease due to Bobs recklessness. If
both Alice and Bob defect, then they are both at risk of catching the disease, but neither
makes any personal sacrifices. Consequently, the payoffs satisfy
S < P < R < T. (1)
The unique equilibrium strategy of this game is mutual defection, and when this game
is used to predict behaviours according to evolutionary game dynamics, the result is al-
ways defection [32]. Nonetheless, in many contexts which fit into a PD type game, co-
operation may in fact be observed [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. In the particular case of
the PD, there have been numerous mechanisms proposed for the evolution of cooperation
[40, 41].
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Here we prove that when the PD is linked to the spread of disease, the evolutionary
game dynamics can result in the entire population tending towards mutual cooperation.
The mechanism of evolution is the replicator equation coupled with a compartmental
model for the spread of diseases for which recovered individuals do not become immune.
Methods
At first emergence, it is unknown and unknowable whether or not recovered individuals
are immune to the disease [42]. Infections like those from the common cold and influenza
do not confer any long-lasting immunity, and individuals become susceptible once they
recover from infection. These diseases are described by the SIS compartmental model.
Poletti et al. [43] implemented a hybrid model in which human decisions affect the rate at
which the disease spreads. They assigned two different rates of infection corresponding
to individuals either changing their behaviour to mitigate the spread of the disease, or not
doing so. We follow this approach by assigning the rates of infection for cooperators and
defectors, βC < βD, respectively. The rate of infection is weighted by the proportion of
cooperators, x, and defectors, 1− x, and is therefore
β = (1− x)βD+ xβC.
We consider three timescales: (i) the disease transmission timescale t, (ii) the timescale
at which individuals decide whether or not to mitigate the spread of the disease α1t, (iii)
the timescale at which individuals receive the PD payoffs α2t.
The replicator equations for our hybrid SIS-PD model are therefore
dI
dt
= ((1− x(t))βD+ x(t)βC)I(t)(1− I(t))− γI(t), (2)
dx
dt
= x(t)(1− x(t)) [α1(βD−βC)I(t)−α2([T −R]x(t)+ [P−S](1− x(t))] .
Above, the quantities on the left side are differentiated with respect to t = time, I is
the portion of the population which is infected, x is the portion of the population which
chooses to cooperate, and γ is the transmission rate. If D is the duration of the infection,
then γ = 1/D. We note that 1− I is the portion of the population which is susceptible to
infection, since in this model there is no immunity.
For the sake of simplicity, and since no generality is lost, we shall assume the PD
payoffs (1) satisfy
T −R = P−S,
leading to the simplified system
dI
dt
= ((1− x(t))βD+ x(t)βC)I(t)(1− I(t))− γI(t), (3)
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dx
dt
= x(t)(1− x(t))[α1(βD−βC)I(t)−α2(T −R)].
Since βD > βC, and T > R, the terms in the equation for the evolution of cooperators
have opposite signs, resulting in a competition between avoidance of disease carriers and
PD reward. Moreover, the relationship between the decision-making and PD-payoff time
scales is key.
Results
The equilibrium points of the SIS-PD system are the set of (x, I):{
(0,0),(1,0),
(
0,1− γ
β D
)
,
(
1,1− γ
β C
)
,(x∗, I∗)
}
where
x∗ =
βD
βD−βC −
γ
(βD−βC)(1− I∗) , I
∗ =
α2(T −R)
α1(βD−βC) .
The equilibrium point, (x∗, I∗), is well-defined as long as x∗ ∈ [0,1], and I∗ ∈ [0,1),
since T > R, and α1,α2 > 0. We compute that
I∗ < 1 ⇐⇒ α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1.
We further compute
0≤ x∗ ⇐⇒
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ≤ α1.
Since 1 < βDβD−γ , this condition immediately implies I
∗ < 1. We note that
βD
βD− γ <
βC
βC− γ
=⇒
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC <
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC .
Whenever it exists, the equilibrium point (x∗, I∗) is always stable (and asymptotically
stable).
The equilibrium point (0,0) is stable (and asymptotically stable) if
βD < γ, T > R.
Since the basic reproduction number R0 = βD/γ , when this condition is satisfied, there
is no epidemic. The equilibrium point (1,0) is never stable for PD payoffs (1). The
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equilibrium point (1,1− γ/βD), is well defined if βD ≥ γ , because 0 ≤ I ≤ 1, and it is
stable (and asymptotically stable) if
α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βD)< α2(T −R).
For PD payoffs (1), this is equivalent to
α1 < α2
(T −R)
(βD−βC)(1− γ/βD) . (4)
The equilibrium point (1,1− γ/βC) is well defined if βC ≥ γ . It is stable (and asymptoti-
cally stable) if
α2(T −R)< α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βC).
Note that if one ‘flips’ the PD payoffs so that T < R, then since βD > βC, and α1,α2 > 0,
this equilibrium point is always stable. For PD payoffs (1), this equilibrium point is stable
(and asymptotically stable) when
α2
(T −R)
(βD−βC)(1− γ/βC) < α1. (5)
Hence, the interesting values of α1 are
α1 <
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC =⇒ ∃
(
0,1− γ
βD
)
,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable. When α1 is greater than or
equal to this value, (
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ≤ α1
=⇒ ∃(x∗, I∗) until α1 = βCβC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable. For α1 > βCβC−γ
α2(T−R)
βD−βC ,
x∗ > 1, so this equilibrium point ceases to exist, but
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1 =⇒ ∃
(
1,1− γ
βC
)
,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable. Figure 2 shows the transi-
tion region between these stability regions for βD = 1.68 and βC = 0.594 and with a mean
infection duration of five (days), that is, γ = 1/5 as suggested in [44], and with α2 = 0.1.
If both α1 and α2 vary, we obtain convergence to cooperation as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: The values of βD, βC and γ above were suggested [44] for the novel corona
virus. When the time scale of decision making is sufficiently faster than the time scale of
the spread of disease, corresponding to large values of α1, the stable equilibrium points
consist of total cooperation. As this time scale slows down, corresponding to small values
of α1, the stable equilibrium point consists of total defection. Since it is the relationship
between α1 and α2, rather than their individual values which affects the dynamics, we
simply fix α2 = 0.1.
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Figure 3: The evolution to cooperation depends on the relationship between α1 and α2,
when the parameters βD, βC and γ are as suggested in [44] and with T −R = 0.75 (left
figure) or T −R = 2 (right figure). Notice the logarithmic scale.
Discussion
If an infectious disease does not confer immunity to those who recover from it, then SIS
is a suitable model. The rate of spread for those who make no mitigation efforts, βD, is
strictly larger than the rate of spread for those who take strong mitigation efforts, βC. Our
results show that the relationship between the time scale of decision making, α1t, and the
timescale of PD payoffs, α2t is crucial. Decision-making is influenced by the speed at
which individuals access or receive information upon which to base their decisions. It is
reasonable to assume that the timescale of PD payoffs is similar to the timescale t for the
spread of disease, or at least on the same order of magnitude. On the other hand, the speed
at which individuals can access information could be much faster. This corresponds to
α1 α2.
Under these conditions, the equilibrium point (x∗, I∗), exists when(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ≤ α1 ≤
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ,
and the equilibrium point (1,1− γ/βC) exists when
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1.
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In general, it is reasonable to assume that strong mitigation efforts are effective, but
not perfect, and therefore βC < βD. When the current parameter estimates for the COVID-
19 outbreak [44] are used, γ < βC. If the speed at which information is available tends to
infinity, while all other parameters remain fixed, then
lim
α1→∞
I∗ = 0, lim
α1→∞
x∗ =
βD− γ
βD−βC > 1.
Consequently, for sufficiently large α1, the unique equilibrium point of the system corre-
sponds to total cooperation. We summarize these insights below.
In the context of a pandemic for which the disease does not confer immunity, if
information is made available to all individuals quickly relative to the spread
of the disease, all rational individuals acting in their best self interest will
evolve to cooperate, mitigating the spread of the disease and driving the rate
of spread to zero.
This insight may be relevant to the general strategy of fighting a new disease, like
COVID-19. At first emergence, it is unknown and unknowable whether contracting and
recovering from the disease grants immunity [42]. Moreover, vaccines require time for
development and testing [45]. It is therefore prudent to use the SIS model for new com-
municable diseases. The first course of action is to obtain information about the disease
and how it is transmitted. Scientists and doctors must be supported in these efforts by
their respective governments. Based on the particulars of the disease, these scientists
and doctors determine effective mitigation measures, so that βC < βD. These mitigation
measures should be rapidly disseminated to the public, together with any equipment nec-
essary to execute the measures (such as face masks). The value of α1 may be associated
to the frequency of public service announcements (PSAs) explaining the recommended
measures. The more frequent the PSAs, the higher the value of α1. Our results prove
that when α1 ↑ ∞, cooperation emerges, and the amount of infections can be controlled.
The perceived benefit of defecting is defined by the PD payoffs (1), so that defecting is
still perceived to offer benefits if others cooperate, but when the time scale for decision
making is much faster than the time scale at which one can actually reap the benefits of
defecting, then the population evolves towards cooperation. Our theoretical predictions
describe the strategy taken in many countries which have been highly successful in man-
aging the COVID-19 outbreak [46, 47, 48]. Our recommendations would not only protect
lives, but also protect economies [49, 13].
Here we have discovered a rigorous mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in
the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, when the dilemma is linked to the spread of disease
according to the compartmental SIS model. It has been suggested that the SIS model also
describes social and group dynamics [24]. Our model may provide a mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation in these social contexts as well.
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Our equations in the SIS-PD model are:
dI
dt
= ((1− x(t))βD+ x(t)βC)I(t)(1− I(t))− γI(t), (6)
dx
dt
= x(t)(1− x(t))[α1(βD−βC)I(t)−α2(T −R)].
Calculation and classification of equilibrium points in the SIS-PD model.
We compute that the equilibrium points of the system are the set of (x, I):{
(0,0),(1,0),
(
0,1− γ
β D
)
,
(
1,1− γ
β C
)
,(x∗, I∗)
}
where
x∗ =
βD
βD−βC −
γ
(βD−βC)(1− I∗) , I
∗ =
α2(T −R)
α1(βD−βC) .
To determine the nature of the equilibrium points, that is whether they are (asymptot-
ically) stable or unstable, we compute the Jacobian matrix[
∂ f
∂ I ,
∂ f
∂x
∂g
∂ I ,
∂g
∂x
]
whose entries are
∂ f
∂ I
= (1−2I)((1− x)βD+ xβC)− γ,
∂ f
∂x
= I(1− I)(βC−βD)
∂g
∂ I
= α1x(1− x)(βD−βC),
∂g
∂x
= (1−2x) [α1(βD−βC)I−α2(T −R)] .
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At the equilibrium point (0,0) the Jacobian matrix is[
βD− γ 0
0 −α2(T −R)
]
.
If the real parts of all eigenvalues are negative, then the equilibrium point is stable and
asymptotically stable. This holds when
βD < γ, T > R.
The Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point (1,0) is[
βC− γ 0
0 α2(T −R)
]
.
Since α2 > 0, and T > R, this equilibrium point is unstable.
The equilibrium point (0,1− γ/βD) has Jacobian matrix[
γ−βD (1− γ/βD)(γ/βD)(βC−βD)
0 α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βD)−α2(T −R)
]
Since 0≤ I ≤ 1, this is well-defined if and only if
γ ≤ βD.
It is stable and asymptotically stable if
α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βD)< α2(T −R).
For PD payoffs, this is equivalent to
α1 <
βD− γ
βD
α2
T −R
βD−βC .
The equilibrium point (1,1− γ/βC) is well-defined if and only if
γ ≤ βC.
It has Jacobian matrix[
γ−βC (1− γ/βC)(γ/βC)(βC−βD)
0 α2(T −R)−α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βC)
]
It is stable and asymptotically stable if
α2(T −R)< α1(βD−βC)(1− γ/βC).
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Note that if one changes the PD payoffs so that T <R, then since βD > βC, and α1,α2 > 0,
this equilibrium point is always stable. The condition above is equivalent to
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1.
The equilibrium point, (x∗, I∗), exists as long as x∗ ∈ [0,1], and I∗ ∈ [0,1), since T >R,
and α1,α2 > 0. We compute that
I∗ < 1 ⇐⇒ α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1.
We further compute
0≤ x∗ ⇐⇒
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ≤ α1.
Since 1 < βDβD−γ , this condition immediately implies I
∗ < 1. We note that
βD
βD− γ <
βC
βC− γ
=⇒
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC <
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC .
We compute the Jacobian matrix[ − I∗γ1−I∗ I∗(1− I∗)(βC−βD)
α1x∗(1− x∗)(βD−βC) 0
]
,
Under these conditions, we compute that it is always stable (and asymptotically stable),
because we compute that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real part,
since the matrix is of the form [− −
+ 0
]
.
Hence, the interesting values of α1 are
α1 <
(
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC =⇒ ∃
(
0,1− γ
βD
)
,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable. When α1 is greater than or
equal to this value, (
βD
βD− γ
)
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ≤ α1
11
=⇒ ∃(x∗, I∗) until α1 = βCβC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC ,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable. For α1 > βCβC−γ
α2(T−R)
βD−βC ,
x∗ > 1, so this equilibrium point ceases to exist, but
βC
βC− γ
α2(T −R)
βD−βC < α1 =⇒ ∃
(
1,1− γ
βC
)
,
and this equilibrium point is stable and asymptotically stable.
Computer simulation details
All simulations were performed with the initial conditions x(0) = 0.5 and I(0) = 0.001 if
otherwise is not stated. The choice of initial conditions does not change the convergence
results, only the dynamics at small times. The ODEs are integrated using the Python
routine scipy.integrate.solve_ivp with default settings.
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